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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PRICE-OREM INVESTMENT COMPANY,
a limited partnership,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
ROLLINS, BROWN

&

No. 19096

GUNNELL, INC.,

Defendant-Respondent.
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HONOP.ABI.E MAURICE HAP.DING, JUDGE, and
PONORABLE DAVIC SAM, JUDGE, presiding.
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Several of respondent's statements of fact find no support in the record.

First, the record does not support

respondent's assertion that Mr. Marshall, the job superintendent for John Price Associates, selected the starting
point of respondent's staking of the corners of the Skaggs'
building.

Respondent's brief at 3, 11.

In fact, David

Thurgood, the witness relied upon by respondent to establish
this point, stated that Mr. Marshall did not point out the
stake as being the correct stake.

Q.

Mr. Marshall didn't go out there and say this
stake is the northwest property corner and used
to stake the building, did he?

A.

I don't have any recollection he said that, no.

Q.

You assumed that the flagged rebar was the property corner, didn't you?

A.

Yes.

R. 423-24.
The record also fails to support respondent's assertion
that appellant acquired additional property (due to a discrepancy between the fence line and title line) after
Rollins, Brown & Gunnell staked the property corners and,
therefore, the survey was no longer correct.
brief at 4.

Respondent's

The testimony cited by respondent as supporting

this assertion does not do so.

In fact, Russell Brown

testified that property corners had been staked for both the
fence line and title line descriptions.

R. 380.

Mr. Brown

further testified that he was aware of the difference between
the two stakes and that the field notes of the survey
reflected which stake marked the fence line and which stake
marked the property line.

R. 380.

In short, the respon-

dent's assertion that property was acquired north of the
fence line after the survey was conducted, creating a new
northwest property corner, is contrary to the testimony of
Mr. Brown and is not supported by the record.
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Finally, the record does not support respondent's contention that it was not hired to locate the foundation for the
Skaggs building on appellant's property.

Respondent's brief

The evidence is undisputed that Rollins, Brown &

at 10.

Gunnell was hired to stake the property corners of appellant's property.

Respondent did so, marking the property

corners with 1-inch diameter rebars.

R. 429.

Pltf. Ex. 4.

Mr. Thurgood testified that the corner he used as a starting
point to lay out the building was marked with a 1-inch
diameter rebar and a 1-inch by 2-incP wooden stake.

"N.W.

property corner" was written on the wooden stake, indicating
that the rebar marked the northwest property corner.
428.

R.

Mr. Thurgood also stated that the wooden stake and

rebar would have been placed by "representatives of persons
that performed the survey of Rollins, Brown & Gunnell • • • "
R. 431.
When respondent returned in 1974 to stake the corners of
the Skaggs building, it used the northwest corner that it had
previously staked as a starting point.

R. 412-13.

Unfor-

tunately, the northwest corner had been staked 30 feet south
of the point shown on the site plan, resulting in defendant
locating the Skaggs building 30 feet south of its intended
location.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENT A NEW TRIAL.
The parties apparently agree that the district court's
order granting a new trial should be affirmed if the record
contains substantial competent evidence which would support a
verdict for respondent.

However, the parties disagree on

whether the record contains such substantial competent evidence.
At the time this matter was tried, the pleadings established that Rollins, Brown & Gunnell erred in staking the
northwest corner of appellant's property when it performed
the survey in 1973.

While respondent "now denies having made

a mistake" [Respondent's brief at 9], the mistake was
admitted at trial.

Respondent now contends that admission of

the mistake does not necessarily admit negligence.

Instead,

respondent argues that Mr. Marshall, the job superintendent,
assisted Mr. Thurgood in selecting the stake to be used as a
starting point.

As indicated above, this argument has no

basis in the record.

In fact, Mr. Thurgood stated that Mr.

Marshall did not select the stake as a starting point.
423-24.

R.

In any event, the stake was placed and marked as the

"N.W. property corner" by respondent.
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It is this initial

mistake in surveying the property and marking the corners
that caused the erroneous staking of the Skaggs building.
Respondent also contends that there was no expert testimony on the standard of care applicable to the surveying and
engineering professions and, therefore, appellant failed to
establish prima facia case of negligence.

By admitting the

mistake in the answer, the elements of duty and breach in the
negligence case were no longer at issue.

All that remained

were the issues of proximate cause and damage.

Were respon-

dent's argument to be accepted, the trial court would have
granted its motion to dismiss at the close of appellant's
evidence.

This was not done, the motion was denied.

Respondent fails to note that the survey was certified as
being accurate by its agent, Carr Greer.

R. 317.

In addi-

tion, expert testimony is not necessary in this sort of
case.

By analogy, a surgeon's negligence in leaving a sponge

in a patient may be established without expert testimony.

If

the act is clearly negligent, no expert testimony is necessary to establish the standard of care.

See Nauman v. Harold

K. Beecher & Associates, 467 P.2d 610 (Utah 1970).

No expert

testimony is necessary to establish that a surveyor has
failed to exercise ordinary care when he erroneously stakes a
boundary corner by thirty feet, especially when the survey is
certified as being accurate.

The idea behind this notion is

-
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that, in some cases, the mistake is so obvious that even a
layman can recognize the error.

Such is the case here.

In any event, the record contains expert testimony demonstrating the standard of care required and breach of that
standard by respondent.

For example, Russell Brown testified

that two sets of property corners were staked, indicating the
fence line and title line.

The survey field notes reflected

which stake was a fence line and which stake was a property
line.

R. 380.

Unfortunately, the field notes differ from

reality, since Mr. Thurgood testified that the northwest
property corner was located south of where it should have
been.
John Price, who holds an engineering degree and has
extensive experience in construction, testified, "There is no
engineer in the world that would stake out a building without
a survey."

R. 238, 258.

However, David Thurgood did not

have a copy of the survey with him at the time the Skaggs
building corners were staked.

R. 418.

The evidence devel-

oped at trial, from both parties' witnesses, demonstrated
that it was not the custom and practice in the surveying
profession to erroneously stake a boundary corner or to stake
a building 30 feet south of where it was shown on the site
plan.

Moreover, respondent admitted, at trial and in its

pleadings, that it erroneously staked the boundary corner of
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appellant's property.
resulted in damages.

It was this act of negligence which
In short, there is no substantial com-

petent evidence in the record which would support a verdict
for respondent on the issue of negligence.
Respondent also argues that appellant failed to act reasonably to mitigate its damages.

First, as noted in Appel-

lant's Brief, respondent failed to plead this issue and mitigation was not properly before the trial court.

This court

held in Pratt v. Board of Education of Uintah County School
District, 564 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977), that a party must plead
the affirmative defense of failure to mitigate damages or be
barred from litigating the issue at trial.

An answer to an

interrogatory does not sufficiently raise the issue to permit
the rule requiring pleading to be ignored.
Secondly, appellant acted reasonably as a matter of law.
Although respondent suggests that the jury reasonably could
have concluded that Price acted summarily in rejecting the
alternatives offered by respondent, it is clear that
appellant would have incurred substantial inconvenience and
risk by attempting to remedy the damage in the fashion
suggested.

For example, a delay of 10 days, the time

estimated by Russell Brown to correct the problem (assuming
that a con- tractor, the equipment and the personnel were
immediately available), would have cost appellant one-half of
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its loan commitment fee, or $19,000.

If Mr. Brown was mis-

taken and the repairs actually took over 30 days, appellant
would have lost an additional $19,000.

As a matter of law,

appellant was not required to assume these risks, simply to
attempt to minimize the damages caused by respondent's negligence.
In addition, there was substantial disagreement between
the parties as to the costs ?f repairing the damage and
moving the Skaggs building 30 feet to the north.

The issue

is whether appellant acted reasonably at the time action was
required.

The information available to appellant indicated

that it would cost approximately $100,000 to repair the damage.

There was no evidence that this estimate was unreason-

able or was arrived at in an unreasonable manner.

Thus,

appellant acted reasonably given the information available to
it at the time action was required.
Respondent also contends appellant suffered no damages,
since there is insufficient parking to permit the construction of an additional 2,100 square feet of shop space at the
shopping center.

First, there is no substantial competent

evidence to support this allegation.

Randall Deschamps, the

Orem City Planning Director from 1972 to 1978, testified that
the parking requirements for a shopping center vary with the
use to which the property is put.
Russell Brown testified as follows:
- 8 -

R. 402-03.

On this issue,

Q.

So depending on the use to which the space in
the center is being put at a given point in
time, it may have sufficient parking at one
point in time and yet insufficient parking at
another point in time, depending upon the particular use that is being made of the space at
that time, isn't that correct?

A.

I suppose that would be right, yes.

Q.

In other words, if the whole thing was one big
restaurant it would require significantly more
parking than if it's one big Skaggs store, isn't
that correct.

A.

That is true.

R. 364.

Respondent's evidence merely indicates that as of

the time its witnesses examined the shopping center, in 1980,
there was insufficient parking for the current use of the
buildings.

There is no substantial competent evidence demon-

strating that an additional 2,100 square feet in shop space
could not be built (if current usage was altered) and could
not have been built in 1974.
Secondly, the issue of parking availability is irrelevant
since appellant's damages were fixed as of the date of the
injury, i.e., 1974.

The evidence is undisputed that there

was sufficient parking at the shopping center in 1974 to construct the shopping center as planned and, in fact, building
permits were issued for all of the buildings on the site
plan.

R. 397-98.
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There was no substantial competent evidence to support a
verdict for respondent on either the issue of liability or
damages; consequently, the district court erred in granting
respondent a new trial.

This court should reverse the order

granting a new trial and remand with instructions to reinstate the jury verdict for appellant, or, in the alternative,
remand for a new trial on the issue of damages only.
POINT If
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT JPA
WAS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY.
John Price Associates, Inc.
the construction project.

("JPA") was the contractor on

JPA issued the purchase order pur-

suant to which Rollins, Brown & Gunnell staked the Skaggs
building.

Prior to the second trial of this matter, the dis-

trict court held, sua sponte, that JPA was a necessary and
indispensable party to the action, apparently because of its
contractual relationship with respondent.

This ruling was

erroneous since appellant may maintain a negligence action
against the respondent, and such was the nature of the Complaint in this matter.
In order for a duty to arise between respondent and
appellant, it must be reasonably foreseeable that appellant
may be injured as a result of respondent's negligence.
rule set forth in Restatement of Torts, § 552,
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The

is merely a

species of foreseeability.

In order to impose liability for

damages, Section 552 requires:

(1) that the actor fail to

exercise that care and competence in obtaining and communicating the information which its recipient is justified in
expecting, and (2) that the harm be suffered by a person for
whose guidance the information was supplied and as a result
of his justifiable reliance upon the information.

The second

prong of this test is merely a requirement that the injury be
foreseeable.
In the instant matter, the injury to Price-Orem Investment is reasonably foreseeable.

Respondent incorrectly sur-

veyed and staked the corners of appellant's property.
Respondent later staked the building corners of the shopping
center, using the incorrect boundary corner as a starting
point.

Certainly it is foreseeable that the owner of the

property, the entity for whose benefit the building is being
built, will be injured by the surveyor's negligence.
A rule requiring an owner to sue its contractor, who in
turn may sue the surveyor, creates an unnecessary complexity.

The damage to appellant was reasonably foreseeable and,

therefore, respondent owed a duty to refrain from negligent
acts.

The court's order dismissing the complaint for failure

to join JPA was in error and should be reversed.
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CONCLUSION
There was no substantial competent evidence to support a
verdict for respondent; consequently, the trial court erred
in granting a new trial.

The district court also erred in

ruling that JPA was a necessary and indispensable party.
This court should reverse the orders of the district court
and remand with instructions to reinstate the jury verdict,
or, in the alternative, remand for a new trial on damages
only, or, in the further alternative, remand for a new trial.
DATED this

qfl...--day of November, 1983.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
By
/
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